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The Role of DNA Patents in Genetic Test 
Innovation and Access 
By Andrew S. Robertson* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
¶1 Recent decades have seen great advances in the science and application of genetics. 
Within healthcare and the health sciences, enhanced knowledge of the human genome—
coupled with rapidly evolving technologies—is providing new opportunities to assess 
common multifactor disorders, such as heart disease, diabetes, asthma, and mental 
illness.1  Moreover, genetic testing has brought us closer to “personalized” or 
“individualized” medicine, which allows for targeted treatment selection, identification, 
and quantification of treatment risks; monitoring of treatment effectiveness and 
prognosis; and personalized disease management.2  The use, understanding, and 
application of genetic information both in healthcare and in other aspects of society will 
continue to increase over time.  
¶2 The effects of gene patents on genetics research and application have been debated 
in a variety of forums.3  The economic and policy issues surrounding patents on genes, 
nucleotide sequences, expressed sequence tags (ESTs),4 single nucleotide polymorphisms 
(SNPs),5 and other genetics-based advances have the potential to significantly impact 
 
* Dr. Robertson is Chief Policy Officer, BIO Ventures for Global Health.  He received his JD from the 
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Certificate in Science & Technology Law), and his PhD 
in genetics from the University of Cambridge, where he was a Gates Cambridge Scholar. 
1 Francis S. Collins, A Brief Primer on Genetic Testing, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST. (Jan. 
24, 2003), http://www.genome.gov/10506784. 
2 See Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins, Welcome to the Genomic Era, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
996 (2003); John Bell, Predicting Disease Using Genomics, 429 NATURE 453 (2004) (discussing the use of 
genetics in predicting disease, drug discovery, disease monitoring, and clinical practice).   
3 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC 
AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
(Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]; SEC’Y’S ADVISORY 
COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND 
LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS (2010) [hereinafter 
SACGHS REPORT], available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf; World Health Organization 
Res. 62.16, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, 
62nd World Health Assembly May 18–22, 2009, 8th Plenary Meeting, A62/VR/8 (May 22, 2009) 
[hereinafter WHA], available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A62/A62_R16-en.pdf. 
4 See Mark D. Adams et al., Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed Sequence Tags and Human 
Genome Project, 252 SCI. 1651 (1991), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/pmidlookup?view=long&pmid=2047873 (“[Expressed sequence tags] have 
applications in the discovery of new human genes, mapping of the human genome, and identification of 
coding regions in genomic sequences.”). 
5 See David G. Wang et. al, Large-Scale Identification, Mapping, and Genotyping of Single-Nucleotide 
Polymorphisms in the Human Genome, 280 SCI. 1077 (2007), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.115.5841&rep=rep1&type=pdf (“Single-
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public health, research, and biotechnology innovation.  Despite these potential positive 
impacts, initial challenges to gene patents have focused on the moral concerns about 
making a commodity out of a part of ourselves.6  Globally, the role of DNA sequence 
patents in addressing challenges—such as international development, global disease, and 
climate change—has often caused a divide between developed and developing countries.7  
These concerns have generated debate and led to the exploration of policy options to 
ensure that gene patents do not impede the practice of medicine and the progress of 
science.   
¶3 The economic debate regarding patents, particularly in healthcare and drug 
development, is often framed as one of access versus innovation.8  Indeed, this debate has 
persisted within the subject of DNA-sequence patents.  While opponents of DNA-
sequence patents cite the barriers that such patents pose to research and healthcare,9 
biotechnology and industry representatives claim that such patents are required for 
innovation in gene-based molecular diagnostics.10  Often, the debate about gene patents is 
analogized to the role of patents in drug discovery and development,11 an industry that is 
estimated to cost approximately $802 million per drug approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) (in 2000 dollars).12  However, several factors call into question the 
validity of this analogy and how it impacts the “innovation” argument in the context of 
DNA sequence patents.   
¶4 This paper analyzes the role of patents in furthering innovation in gene-based 
molecular diagnostics.  Part II provides a quick background of the science of genetic 
testing and an explanation of patent law as it pertains to DNA sequence patents.  Part II 
also discusses in further detail the effect of gene-sequence patents in the field of DNA 
research and clinical healthcare.  Part III discusses the barriers that patents represent in 
the field of genetic testing, both in terms of innovation and access.  Part IV discusses 
whether there is a positive need for patents in genetic test development, with a focus on 
 
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) are the most frequent type of variation in the human genome, and they 
provide powerful tools for a variety of medical genetic studies.”).  
6 See Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health 
Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 69–70 (2002). 
7 See generally WHA, supra note 3; SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
BONN GUIDELINES ON ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE SHARING OF THE 
BENEFITS ARISING OUT OF THEIR UTILIZATION (2002), available at www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-
bonn-gdls-en.pdf; WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. [WIPO], Examination of Issues Regarding the Interrelation 
of Access to Genetic Resources and Disclosure Requirements in Intellectual Property Rights Applications, 
WIPO Doc. WO/GA/32/8 (2005), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/laws/pdf/examination_of_issues.pdf. 
8 See, e.g., Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 849 (2002). 
9 For example, one such barrier posed by such patents is a patient’s inability to test their susceptibility to 
a heritable disease, such as breast cancer.  
10 See, e.g., Richard Van Noorden, DNA Patent Ruling Hinders Monsanto, NATURE NEWS (July 9, 
2010), http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100709/full/news.2010.345.html; Gene Patent Ruling Stalls 
Biotech Rally-Myriad (MYGN) Down 4.9%, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS BLOG (Mar. 
30, 2010), http://www.genengnews.com/blog-biotech/gene-patent-ruling-stalls-biotech-rally-myriad-mygn-
down-4-9/614/. 
11 See, e.g., Brief for BayBio et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants, Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
12 Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003). 
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both the costs of gene test research and development (R&D) and the market rewards 
associated with bringing a genetic test to market.  Part IV further discusses these 
associated costs and rewards in comparison to those of pharmaceutical development, 
where appropriate.  Part V summarizes this discussion, concluding that even though 
patents provide inhibitive roles in genetic test innovation and access, it is also 
questionable whether DNA-sequence patents are necessary to incentivize genetic test 
development.     
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Science of Genetic Testing 
¶5 Most aspects of human biology stem from either genetic (hereditary) or 
environmental (nonhereditary) factors.  After the human genome was first sequenced, 
researchers increasingly studied how genetic variation contributes to heritable traits and 
disease.13  While some genetic traits, such as height and eye color, are only slightly 
influenced by environmental factors, other traits, such as obesity and some forms of 
cancer, only manifest in combination with—or as a result of the absence of—certain 
environmental conditions.14  Regardless, identifying genetic variations and understanding 
their physiological manifestation (termed phenotype) can offer valuable insights into 
human biology, predisposition to disease, and response to particular therapeutics.  
Applying these insights in clinical healthcare is the cornerstone of personalized medicine, 
specifically the ability to tailor medical care to an individual based on his or her 
particular genetic makeup.15 
¶6 Utilizing these insights in clinical practice begins with knowledge about gene 
sequence and DNA sequence variation.  There are many different kinds of variation, 
ranging from complete, extra, or missing chromosomes down to single nucleotide 
changes.  Each variation utilizes a different laboratory technique for detection and 
analysis.16  Most studies of human genetic variation begin with the full gene sequence 
and focus on SNPs, which are substitutions in individual bases along a chromosome.17  
Experts estimate that SNPs occur, on average, somewhere between one in every hundred 
and one in every thousand base pairs in the human genome.18  By conducting familial 
studies or larger “genome-wide association studies” (GWAs), researchers look for 
statistically significant links between genetic variation and phenotypes.19  This linkage 
 
13 See Bell, supra note 2; Elizabeth Pennisi, Human Genetic Variation, 318 SCI. 1842 (2007). 
14 See generally Muin J. Khoury et al., Do We Need Genomic Research for the Prevention of Common 
Diseases with Environmental Causes?, 161 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 799, 802 (2005) (discussing approaches 
to identifying gene-environment interaction). 
15 See Guttmacher & Collins, supra note 2, at 996–98; Bell, supra note 2, at 453–55 (discussing the use 
of genetics in predicting disease, drug discovery, disease monitoring, and clinical practice with respect to 
individualization).   
16 See Nicholas Wade, Genetic Catalog May Aid Search for Roots of Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 
2005, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/27/science/27genome.html. 
17 See Id. 
18 See Int’l HapMap Consortium, A Haplotype Map of the Human Genome, 437 NATURE 1299, 1301 
(2005). 
19 Thomas A. Pearson & Teri A. Manolio, How to Interpret a Genome-Wide Association Study, 299 
JAMA 1335 (2008). 
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serves as the scientific basis for genetic tests; by testing for specific genetic variations, 
physicians can determine risk for disease, understand behavioral characteristics, and 
identify genetic causes of existing conditions.20  These studies have led to genetic tests 
for approximately 1,400 genetic variations, with more than 1,000 additional tests 
currently in development.21  
B. Legal Issues Regarding Gene Patents 
¶7 The number of DNA sequence patents grew dramatically during the Human 
Genome Project and similar international efforts to better understand the human 
genome.22  Patents are designed to encourage innovation by granting to inventors, for a 
limited period of time, the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the 
patented invention.  This system was established in the U.S. Constitution two centuries 
ago in order to create incentives for technological innovation.23  Accordingly, U.S. patent 
laws are designed to ensure that the public benefits from a new invention in exchange for 
the right to exclude others from making, using or selling his or her invention for twenty 
years from the date of the application.24  In short, patents have a utilitarian function in 
U.S. law and exist to promote a positive good—specifically, “progress in the sciences and 
useful arts.”25  The legal requirements of obtaining a patent are multifold.  First, patents 
are not allowed on products of nature or on scientific formulas, because the public would 
not be gaining anything new by virtue of the inventor.26  As the U.S. Supreme Court has 
pointed out: 
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not 
patentable. . . .  Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found 
in the wild is not patentable subject matter.  Likewise, Einstein could not patent 
his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of 
gravity.  Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.”27  
¶8 Further, for a gene to be patented, the patent applicant must show that his or her 
invention is (1) useful, (2) novel, and (3) nonobvious.28  The usefulness of the inventions 
 
20 Id.; see also Khoury, supra note 14, at 802. 
21 See Charles Schmidt, Regulators Weigh Risks of Consumer Genetic Tests, 26 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 145, 145 (2008) (quoting Steve Gutman, FDA’s director for in vitro diagnostics). 
22 Between 1990 and 2003, countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, 
Germany, and China, invested over an estimated $3 billion to sequence the 3.3 billion base pairs within the 
human genome.  See, The Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT;L 
HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST. http://www.genome.gov/11006943 (last visited Mar. 22, 2011); Leslie 
Roberts, Controversial from the Start, 291 SCI. 1182 (2001). 
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
24 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (2006).  
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
26 Andrews, supra note 6, at 67–68. 
27 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted). 
28 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103. 
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must be specific, substantive, and credible.29  The patent application must also be 
adequately “enabling.”30  That is, it must describe the invention fully, in a way that would 
allow another person who is skilled in that field to reproduce the invention.  Thus, the key 
tradeoff considered in patent law is the public disclosure of information in exchange for 
the right to exclude anybody from using that invention. 
¶9 At present, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that genetically engineered 
organisms can qualify as patentable subject matter,31 and the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO)32 and the European Patent Office33 have treated isolated and purified 
nucleotide sequences as if they were the same as patentable man-made chemicals. 
¶10 DNA patents in particular raise several unique issues.  DNA has an inherent 
duality, both as tangible material and intangible information, posing both practical and 
legal problems for gene patenting and patent enforcement.34  Further, the finite number of 
genes within the human genome—approximately 23,000—makes it difficult (if not 
impossible) to “invent around” a genetic patent in order to create an equivalent, but non-
infringing invention.35  In addition, inventions such as genetic diagnostics could involve 
multiple patents or licensing agreements, giving rise to concerns of a “patent thicket” or 
“anti-commons effect,” requiring multiple licensing agreements that potentially increase 
the costs of genetic tests.36   
¶11 Philosophically, the question of “owning” human genes has been scrutinized 
significantly.37  Allowing a company to exclude others from testing, using, or 
experimenting with genes present in every cell of our own bodies draws criticism from 
human rights experts.  Gene patents directly prevent doctors from testing for various 
diseases, leaving patients no longer in control of their own bodies.38  A patient who 
cannot get a doctor to test for a genetic condition inherent to his own genetic make-up 
can be said to have lost control over that genetic make-up, and thus, over himself.  
Moreover, opponents of gene patents argue that these practices violate the First 
Amendment by limiting an individual’s freedom of expression.39  Lori Andrews, 
 
29 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107 (8th ed. revised Jul. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2107.htm.  
30 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
31 Diamond, 447 U.S. at 303. 
32 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (“[W]here the application 
discloses a specific, substantial, and credible utility for the claimed isolated and purified gene, the isolated 
and purified gene composition may be patentable.”). 
33 European Patent Convention arts. 52, 53(a), 53(b), Oct. 5, 1973, available at 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/apii.html.  See also Biotechnology in European 
Patents-Threat or Promise?, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (last updated Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.epo.org/topics/issues/biotechnology.html. 
34 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA 
Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 786–89 (2000). 
35 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 22; see also Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 786–789.  
36 See NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 125–28. 
37 See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and 
Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 247 (2000). 
38 Andrews, supra note 6, at 91–94. 
39 David Kravets, Judge OKs Challenge to Human-Gene Patents, WIRED (Nov. 2, 2009, 8:11 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/11/genes/. Complaint at 19, 22–25, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
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Professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law, describes this loss of control as if “the first 
surgeon who took a kidney out of your body then patented the kidney.”40 
¶12 Currently, 20% of the approximately 23,000 genes in the human genome are 
covered by at least one active patent.41  While supporters of gene patenting maintain that 
the patent system is a critical component of innovation and progress in the field of 
personalized medicine, opponents claim that the patents cause significant barriers to 
research into human genetics and proper healthcare through the use of gene-based 
molecular diagnostics.  
C. AMP v. USPTO (“Myriad”) 
¶13 In March 2010, a federal district court judge issued the first ruling directly 
addressing the patentability of DNA sequences.42  The lawsuit was brought by the 
Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP), who was represented by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), against Myriad Genetics and the USPTO.  It challenged the 
idea that isolated nucleic acid molecules (the sequence of A, T, G, and C that comprise 
the human genome) can be patented.  In his fifty-two page opinion, Judge Sweet found 
that the patented DNA sequences were not “markedly different” from DNA sequences 
found in nature within the human body, and as such were not patentable subject matter.43  
The federal court specifically cited the inherent qualities of DNA, stating, “DNA, and in 
particular the ordering of its nucleotides . . . serves as the physical embodiment of laws of 
nature—those that define the construction of the human body.”44  Although plaintiffs 
asserted that gene patents infringe on First Amendment liberties, the court did not fully 
address this legal question.45  Myriad is currently being appealed to the Federal Circuit, 
and experts on both sides believe it will go all the way to the Supreme Court.   
¶14 The Myriad case focused on Myriad’s patented genetic tests for mutations in two 
breast-cancer genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2.46  As part of its patent, Myriad claimed the 
complementary DNA sequences of various tumorgenic BRCA1 mutations and gene 
fragments.47  Because testing for the BRCA mutated gene sequences typically involves 
 
40 60 Minutes: Patented Genes (CBS television broadcast Apr. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6362525n. 
41 Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 SCI. 239 
(2005). 
42 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
43 Id. at 229–30. 
44 Id. at 228. 
45 Id. at 238. 
46 BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations (or “breast cancer 1” and “breast cancer 2”) dramatically increase a 
woman's lifetime risk of developing breast or ovarian cancer.  Women with BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations 
have an 87% chance of developing breast cancer by age 70 (compared with 10% for the general population) 
and a 59% chance of developing the disease by age 50.  Women with the BRCA1 mutation have a 44% 
chance of developing ovarian cancer by age 70.  About 5 to 10% of all female breast cancer is due to the 
inheritance of mutated copies of BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes.  There are over 235 known genetic variations of 
BRCA1 mutations, sprinkled through 100,000 bp in the gene, which encodes a protein made of 1,863 amino 
acids.  There are about 100 mutations of the BRCA2 gene, which encodes a protein made of 3,418 amino 
acids.  Donna Shattuck-Eidens et al., BRCA1 Sequence Analysis in Women at High Risk for Susceptibility 
Mutations, 278 JAMA 1242 (1997); David Resnik, Are DNA Patents Bad for Medicine?, 65  HEALTH & 
POL’Y 181 (2003). 
47 “[Complementary DNA] is DNA that has been made from the messenger RNA (mRNA) transcript of 
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using reagents consisting of fragments of the BRCA genes, Myriad’s exclusive rights over 
the mutated allele fragments enabled it to exclude others from performing BRCA testing 
(even preventing individuals performing tests on themselves).  In essence, the patents 
granted to Myriad gave the company the exclusive right to perform diagnostic tests on the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and to prevent any researcher or individual from isolating and 
studying the genes without first getting permission from Myriad.  Myriad charges 
between $350 and $3,150 for the BRCA test, and has succeeded in stopping many 
laboratories from performing the test if they lack the proper license.48 
III. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF GENE PATENTING 
¶15 Myriad illustrates the core issues surrounding gene patents—namely, their effect on 
research and development (innovation) and on clinical healthcare (access).  Not 
addressed within Myriad, but equally relevant, is the effect of DNA sequence patents in 
human diagnostic contexts, including infectious disease diagnostics, genetically modified 
organisms, gene-based therapeutics, and synthetic biology technologies.  These issues are 
discussed below in turn.  
A. Effect of Gene Patents on Innovation and R&D 
¶16 Despite numerous studies, the full impact that gene patents have had on academic 
research is still unclear.49  With the advent of high-throughput DNA sequencing,50 
researchers and firms began patenting genes without fully understanding their 
physiological function.  Patent applications filed by the National Institutes of Health on 
the first ESTs identified by Craig Venter set off alarm bells throughout the scientific 
community.51  These patent applications were significantly upstream within the R&D 
pipeline, and the actual functions of these genes and their protein derivatives were 
unknown.  Issuance of a patent on such an invention grants the patent-holder the right to 
prevent any additional researcher from investigating its properties further.52  Following a 
 
a gene.  A cDNA sequence, like a mature mRNA sequence, differs from a gene sequence in that it lacks the 
non-coding regions of the gene.” SACGHS REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. 
48 Shannon Kieran et al., The Role of Financial Factors in Acceptance of Clinical BRCA Genetic 
Testing, 11 GENETIC TESTING 101, 101 (2007); Complaint at 19, 22–25, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
49 See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 127; Robert Cook-Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and 
Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast 
and Ovarian Cancers with Colon Cancers, 12 GENETICS MED. S15, S28 (2010). 
50 High-throughput DNA sequencing automates the sequencing process, producing thousands or 
millions of sequences at once, resulting in a significant reduction in both time and cost.  See generally 
Stephan C. Schuster, Next-Generation Sequencing Transforms Today's Biology, 5 NATURE METHODS 16 
(2008); Automated Sequencing and Genotyping, EUROGENTEC, 
http://www.eurogentec.com/applications/automated-sequencing-and-genotyping.html?country=usa (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2011). 
51 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 72–73.  See also David Dickson, UK Clinical Geneticists Ask for Ban 
on the Patenting of Human Genes, 366 NATURE 391, 391 (1993).  Craig Ventor led a parallel private sector 
effort in competition with the publicly funded international Human Genome Project.  The two projects 
were announced as a tie by then-President Clinton in 2003.  Jamie Shreeve, The Blueprint of Life, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 31, 2005, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051031/31genome.htm. 
52 Andrews, supra note 6, at 79, 81. 
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wave of genetic sequencing that occurred in the late 1990s, approximately 20% of the 
23,000 human genes became protected by at least one patent.53  From 1971 until 2006, 
approximately 33,000 nucleic acid patents were issued.54 
¶17 Generally speaking, when encountering a patent-protected gene, research scientists 
are faced with three options: (1) stop or avoid researching the particular gene; (2) license 
the rights to research the gene from the patent holder; or (3) continue research regardless 
of legal liability.  Studies suggest that each of these pathways is exercised; however, 
these studies conflict as to which of these three options is the overall dominant choice.55  
Indeed, the choice made is often dependent on the DNA sequence in question and the line 
of research pursued.  Regardless, the exercise of any of these three options could 
potentially work to reduce fundamental R&D in human genetics.   
¶18 The first two of these options faced by researchers interested in a patent-protected 
gene—stopping research and licensing the rights to research—can be illustrated by 
research conducted on the gene associated with hemochromatosis, a hereditary liver 
disease caused by progressive iron overload.56  Approximately 80 to 85 % of 
hemochromatosis cases are caused by two specific mutations in the gene HFE, making it 
a prime candidate for genetic screening tests.57   
¶19 SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories (SBCL), owner of the patents of the 
gene and its two mutations, began enforcing the patents in 1998.58  While many U.S. 
laboratories began genetic testing for hemochromatosis before the patents were awarded, 
as many as 30% of the 119 laboratories surveyed ceased research as soon as the patent 
rights were enforced.59  For those researchers looking to continue developing a genetic 
test, SBCL asked for an upfront fee of $25,000 from academic laboratories and as much 
as $250,000 from commercial laboratories, plus a fee of $20 per test.60  The patent 
interfered with clinical adoption of the test and potentially compromised the quality of 
testing by limiting the development of higher quality or lower cost alternative testing 
methods. 
¶20 The hemochromatosis case study can demonstrate how a gene patent, when 
enforced, can serve to stifle or hinder human genetics research.  Despite this example, 
however, several surveys and case studies indicate that many researchers would pursue 
the third option—choose to ignore, not inquire, or remain unaware of the intellectual 
property status of many of the genes being studied.61  This can be attributed to a number 
of factors: for example, the decision not to enforce gene patents by patent holders or the 
assumption that fundamental research is exempt under U.S. patent law.62  In a 2005 
 
53 Jensen & Murray, supra note 41, at 239. 
54 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 101. 
55 See, e.g., John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCI. 2002, 
2002 (2005) (indicating that most researchers don’t even consider whether patents are relevant to their 
research). 
56 See Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patents are Illustrated by the 
Case of Haemochromatosis, 415 NATURE 577, 577 (2002). 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 578. 
59 Id. at 578–79. 
60 Id. at 578. 
61 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 55; SACGHS REPORT, supra note 3, at 52. 
62 See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 13 (indicating that academic researchers believe their 
research is exempt); see also Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 49, at S28 (describing Myriad’s “de facto 
 384
Vol. 9:7] Andrew S. Robertson 
survey of U.S. genetics researchers conducted by the National Academy of Sciences and 
John Walsh, a large majority of scientists failed to even consider whether the genes they 
were researching were covered by a patent.63  Commonly, researchers assumed that any 
potentially infringing activity in which they were engaged was allowed under the 
“experimental use exemption,” which grants infringers the right to use a patented 
invention for research and non-commercial purposes.64   
¶21 However, in the landmark case Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Circuit made 
clear that the experimental use exemption was not applicable to certain academic 
research.65  The case centered on a former Duke University professor who sued the 
university for patent infringement when, after he left, it continued to use equipment that 
he had patented.66  The lower court held that the university could not be liable for patent 
infringement, because its uses were “solely for research, academic, or experimental 
purposes.”67  However, the federal court found that research that is part of the “legitimate 
business” of the university is not exempt from patent liability “regardless of commercial 
implications” or lack thereof.68  In short, any researcher studying a patented gene, 
whether or not aware that he or she is infringing, is in violation of the patent-holder’s 
rights.   
¶22 Further, while many patent holders have not actively enforced their patent rights, 
many firms have failed to expressly state their intent to allow potentially infringing 
research to continue.  For example, Myriad maintains it has never enforced its patents 
against researchers and does not enforce its patents against laboratories providing BRCA 
testing services in a form it does not do itself.69  However,  
Myriad never publicly stated its de facto research use exemption policy.  Myriad 
either passed on an opportunity to demonstrate its intentions publicly in written 
form or avoided comment to keep legal options open.  And keeping options open 
equates to a chilling effect in zones of uncertainty. . . .  Ambiguity may itself 
stifle basic or clinical research as researchers either avoid the work altogether or 
are wary of publicly reporting results.70 
B. Effect of Gene Patents on Patient Access 
¶23 Although the effect on R&D is uncertain, the negative effect that DNA sequence 
patents have in clinical healthcare has led to more conclusive findings.  The barriers to 
access of gene-based molecular diagnostics by patients and healthcare can be 
characterized into two separate, nonexclusive categories—barriers due to test availability 
and barriers due to test price.   
 
research use exemption policy”). 
63 NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 121–22, 125–26. 
64 See id. at 13–14. 
65 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
66 Id. at 1352–53. 
67 Id. at 1361 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
68 Id. at 1362. 
69 Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 49, at S16. 
70 Id. at S28. 
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1. Reduced Availability of State-of-the-Art Genetic Tests Caused by DNA Patent 
Licensing Practices 
¶24 The barrier to access due to test availability refers to the effect that patents and 
licensing practices have in restricting patient choice of genetic tests in terms of quality 
and accuracy.  These harms are most clearly seen when an exclusive license is issued by 
a patent holder resulting in only a single laboratory that is allowed to perform a given 
test.  For example, by preventing second opinion testing and obstructing access to top-
quality testing, patient access to testing can suffer under these circumstances.  
¶25 The case brought by the ACLU against Myriad offers a compelling and emotional 
example.  Faced with a positive test result indicating a significant predisposition to breast 
cancer, Genae Girard had to make the difficult decision whether or not to undergo a 
preemptive dual mastectomy and hysterectomy.71  These operations are life-altering and 
affect fundamental decisions regarding family, health, and lifestyle.  Naturally, because 
human error is possible in any test of this sort, and Myriad utilizes only one of many 
diagnostic strategies for the BRCA genes, Ms. Girard sought a second opinion using a 
testing technique not utilized by Myriad.72  However, within the United States, Myriad is 
the sole provider of the genetic tests for BRCA1 and BRCA2 by virtue of its patents.73  By 
exercising its patent rights, Myriad eliminated the availability of second opinion BRCA 
testing.74   
¶26 Without broad licensing, the availability of alternative testing techniques, medical 
second opinions, and testing verification is severely limited.  This critique of patenting is 
related to the reduced incentives that monopoly holders have to introduce newer, cheaper, 
or alternative tests.75  For example, consider MLPA: 
[T]here is an alternative diagnostic technique to BRCA called MLPA, a molecular 
way to detect genetic variations, including BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations, under 
development at University of Washington.  Using MLPA, a 2006 study published 
in the JAMA found that Myriad’s testing strategy missed up to 12% of large 
genomic deletions or duplications. . . .  [T]he missed mutations were not because 
of a technical error in Myriad’s testing but a flaw in the testing strategy. . . .  The 
article noted “many mutations are inherently not detectable by short-range 
[polymerase chain reaction used by Myriad] followed by genomic sequencing.”76   
Because it is already the patent holder and sole provider of the BRCA tests, Myriad has 
little incentive to adopt advanced testing techniques or allow patients to seek alternative 
or confirmatory testing.  
 




75 Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 49, at S29. 
76Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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2. Question of Whether DNA Patents Create Access Barriers Due to Price Distortions 
¶27 Price is a second key factor in preventing clinical access to genetic tests.  Again, 
the ACLU provided a sympathetic story in their case against Myriad.  Ms. Lisbeth 
Ceriani was diagnosed with breast cancer at age forty-two,77 a younger age than is 
typically associated with these types of cancers.  Breast cancer at a young age is often 
hereditary,78 and it calls for more aggressive treatment, including preemptive removal of 
both breasts and ovaries.  Although Ms. Ceriani had insurance that would pay for a 
portion of the test, which was a $3,200 cost, Myriad would not accept her insurance 
plan.79  Without the insurance payment, she was unable to afford the test.80 
¶28 While price can be prohibitive, it is unclear the extent to which this effect is a result 
of DNA patents.  Studies conducted in the past few years have shown that between 19% 
and 74% of at-risk individuals who could benefit from BRCA testing are not being 
tested.81  In these studies, the out-of-pocket costs to individual patients were reduced 
considerably for those who have health plans.82  However, of the women who were 
eligible for testing and whose costs were covered—either through their insurance 
companies or through programs offered by Myriad—only 70% of them have had the 
BRCA test.83  If price was the only consideration, presumably a higher percentage of 
women would have undergone testing.  Regardless, price certainly had some effect, 
because only 22% of out-of-pocket payers chose to get the test performed.84   
¶29 Whether this price effect was a result of patents, however, is less clear.  The 
complaint states that costs of BRCA testing in the U.S. are expensive and could be 
lowered if researchers could move forward freely.85  In fact, testing in the U.S. is five 
times as expensive as that of testing in places, such as France, where the patents on the 
BRCA genes were ruled invalid.86  However, studies comparing the cost of the Myriad 
BRCA test, of which Myriad is the sole provider, with the costs of Myriad gene tests for 
the colon cancer genes FAP and HNPCC, in which fields Myriad has four and six 
competitors respectively, show little monopolistic effect on pricing.87  Breaking the test 
down to price per amplicon (the price for each genetic test per DNA segment amplified 
per PCR), Myriad charges $38.05 per amplicon for their BRCA test, $40.80 per amplicon 
for their FAP test (nonprofit competitors charge between $28.57 and $39.88 per 
amplicon), and $49.17 per amplicon for their HNPCC test (nonprofit competitors charge 
between $30.00 and $77.44 per amplicon).88  These studies indicate that competition does 
little to affect price overall. 
 
77 60 Minutes: Patented Genes, supra note 40. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  See also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 
188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
81 Kieran et al., supra note 48, at 101. 
82 Id. at 102. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Complaint at 27, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
86 See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 49, at S28. 
87 Id. at S23–24. 
88 Id. at S17. 
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¶30 Disconnects between patents and price can be attributed to a number of factors.  
First, the downstream costs of a positive test, which can include counseling and possibly 
surgery, can be far greater than the test itself.89  As such, when considering the combined 
costs of both diagnosis and treatment, the price of the genetic tests is relatively minor.90  
Further, at least in the case of BRCA testing, patentee monopolists benefit by directing the 
entirety of the market into their laboratories.  Patent premiums depend on both the price 
elasticity of demand for a gene test and how the patent holder has chosen to set its price 
point for different purchasers.91  Myriad has worked to set BRCA test prices to decrease 
access barriers and reduce what economists’ term deadweight loss.92  Further, by creating 
a number of patient access programs for those unable to cover the out-of-pocket 
expenses, Myriad adopted a de facto tiered pricing model to accommodate a majority of 
the demand.  
¶31 While licensing practices appear to pose a more significant barrier to access than 
price, it is worth noting an example of how these two elements can overlap—
consolidation of testing facilities.93  Again, turning to the Myriad/BRCA example, Myriad 
has a strong incentive to develop the infrastructure to handle billing and payment for 
BRCA testing, because it captures all the revenues from market expansion.  However, 
from a payer, health care provider, or patient point of view, this structure requires a 
redundancy of efforts if a patient is seeking genetic testing for multiple markers—for 
example, colon cancer, Alzheimer’s, and Huntington’s.  Assuming that providers could 
achieve sufficient volume to justify setup costs, consolidation of these administrative 
tasks at a few broad-service genetic testing laboratories—as opposed to the establishment 
of several gene-specific testing facilities—could help spread and bring down the overall 
administrative costs of gene testing.  However, licensing practices by many DNA patent 
holders have foregone this approach.  
3. Ability of DNA Patents to Increase Access Through Improved Marketing 
¶32 Finally, it is worth mentioning a potential benefit that DNA patents bring in the 
context of access to genetic testing: increased awareness through advertising.  Securing a 
limited period of market exclusivity for gene patents creates an incentive for 
communication and marketing aimed at educating patients and health professionals who 
are interested in purchasing the product.  As seen in the pharmaceutical sector, the 
incentive for direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising to broaden the market is stronger for 
a monopoly provider than it is in a shared market, because a monopolist will gain the full 
benefit of market expansion.94  In theory, this advertising creates a social benefit in terms 
of greater public knowledge of genetic testing and test availability.   
 
89 Id. at S30. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at S31. 
92 Deadweight loss in economic terms refers to the costs to society that occur through inefficiencies in 
the market.  These inefficiencies are often due to the difference between market price and actual price, 
which can occur through factors such as monopolistic pricing or taxes.  Here, by decreasing the price of 
BRCA tests closer to market prices, Myriad can reduce this inefficiency.  
93 See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 49, at S33. 
94 See generally Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription 
Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 680 (2007) (indicating that generic drugs are typically not promoted). 
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¶33 Myriad launched several targeted DTC advertising campaigns to great effect.95  In a 
study conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Myriad’s advertising 
for BRCA testing increased the number of at-risk women who pursued genetic testing by 
close to 140%, yet there was no increase in the actual testing of low-risk women.96  
Further, the study found that anxiety associated with over-testing—an oft-cited downside 
of DTC advertising of genetic testing97—showed little difference in the targeted 
marketing areas.98  This suggests that, at least in some contexts, patents may improve 
access through raising awareness among at-risk individuals.  
IV. PATENTS AND INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION IN GENETIC TESTING 
¶34 Proponents of DNA patents maintain that, despite the negative effects cited in Part 
III.A and Part III.B, patents are required to incentivize innovation in personalized 
medicine.99  These arguments are often made through analogies to drug development—
patent incentives help secure commercial markets following development of a genetic 
test, discourage competition, attract investment, and draw creative minds to unmet social 
needs.100   
¶35 However, the promise of market exclusivity is certainly not required in order to 
bring a product to market.  One need only look to high-tech industries, such as generic 
drug manufacturing and software development, to observe that innovation can take place 
without a patent-created monopoly as an incentive.  The past also provides many 
examples where innovation in biotechnology is not predicated on the promise of 
exclusivity—Jonas Salk, who in 1955 developed a vaccine for polio, endeared himself to 
the public by refusing to patent the vaccine.101  In the context of personalized medicine, 
genetic testing for cystic fibrosis serves as a further example.  When Francis Collins and 
colleagues “first cloned the [cystic fibrosis-linked] CFTR gene, they worked to ensure 
broad licensing.”102  Twenty years later, dozens of laboratories—both private and 
public—compete in CFTR testing on the basis of service, innovation, and quality.103  
While the steps of the drug development pathway mirror those of genetic test 
development, the costs, risks, and rewards of the two product development pathways 
differ significantly.   
¶36 Principally, the question could perhaps be best phrased as: “Without DNA patents, 
would there be adequate incentive to innovate in the field of personalized medicine?”  An 
immediate challenge arises in measuring innovation itself: at present, commonly agreed-
upon metrics for innovation are not available, and proxies—such as patents, products 
 
95 J. Jacobellis et al., Genetic Testing for Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility: Evaluating Direct-
to-Consumer Marketing—Atlanta, Denver, Raleigh-Durham, and Seattle, 2003, 53 CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 603, 603 (2004). 
96 Cook-Deegan et al. et al., supra note 49, at S32. 
97 See Timothy A. Caulfield & E. Richard Gold, Genetic Testing, Ethical Concerns, and the Role of 
Patent Law, 57 CLINICAL GENETICS 370, 371 (2000). 
98 Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 49, at S32. 
99 See, e.g., Brief for BayBio et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants, Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
100 See Id. 
101 60 Minutes: Patented Genes, supra note 40. 
102 James P. Evans, Putting Patients Before Patents, 12 GENETICS MED. S3, S3 (2010). 
103 60 Minutes: Patented Genes, supra note 40. 
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brought to market, and R&D funding—are not each in themselves suitable.104  For 
example, R&D costs are inherently difficult to quantify, since the process for discovery 
and development is often nonlinear.  Establishing a fundamental understanding of 
scientific processes, biological pathways, or developing strategies for drug development 
is rarely a de novo process.  Instead, it is the culmination of years of research from 
academic, government, and private sectors.    
¶37 Without the availability of defined innovation metrics, the next best course of 
action is to consider innovation incentives as a function of two distinct variables: the cost 
of bringing a genetic test to market (costs) and the size of the market itself (rewards).  
The greater the ratio there is between “rewards” and “costs,” the greater the incentive to 
innovate and bring a product to market.  While this analysis may overlook additional 
incentives, including professional advancement and publication, it nonetheless is 
appropriate when considering the role of genetic testing in personalized medicine.  This 
testing requires both knowledge and application—improving our scientific understanding 
of human genetics and applying this understanding in a healthcare setting.     
A. The Costs of Bringing a Genetic Test to Market are Significantly Less than Those of 
Drug Discovery and Development 
¶38 “Proponents of gene patents have tried to justify such patents by claiming that the 
arguments in favor of patenting drugs apply to patenting genes as well.”105  Patenting 
drugs may be justified considering the heavy investment needed to shepherd a drug 
candidate through development to market.106  Drug development requires early capital to 
finance animal research and human clinical trials, as well as to obtain approval from the 
FDA.  Likewise, the failure rate of drug candidates during the development phase is high 
and carries with it a significant cost of capital.  These costs arguably require stronger 
guarantees for market exclusivity in order to recoup costs in the future.  Patents, in turn, 
offer a tangible way of protecting the consumer market for their respective drugs, and 
they help to recoup the costs and risks undertaken by the drug developers.   
¶39 The first component of determining how the drug development analogy applies to 
DNA patenting—the cost of bringing a genetic test to market—can be further separated 
into two distinct costs: R&D and marketing approval.  Comparisons with drug 
development demonstrate that, in both R&D and marketing approval, the costs associated 
with bringing a genetic test to market are significantly lower than with a similar process 
in drug development.    
1. Research and Development Costs of Genetic Tests Are Significantly Lower than 
Those in Drug Discovery 
¶40 In the pharmaceutical industry, costs for early stage drug discovery are 
significant.107  Candidate drug discovery involves different stages, including basic 
exploratory biology on target identification and validation, assay development, lead 
 
104 See Keith Smith, Measuring Innovation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 148, 148 (Jan 
Fagerberg et al. eds., 2005). 
105 Andrews, supra note 6, at 77. 
106 See DiMasi, supra note 12, at 151–52. 
107 Id. at 152. 
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identification (which usually requires access to high-throughput screening), medicinal 
chemistry and pharmaceutical lead optimization, and drug candidate selection.108  Drug 
candidates fail to achieve FDA approval for a variety of reasons.  Approximately 39% of 
failures are caused by biopharmaceutical issues, such as oral bioavailability and 
formulation problems, whereas toxicity constitutes about 21% of failures.109  Another 
crucial factor is lack of efficacy, which is responsible for about 29% of failures.110  
¶41 Early-stage drug discovery involves several phases that can vary depending on the 
disease, state of the science, and approach used.111  In general, however, this early 
discovery utilizes early stage research, which consists of target identification, hit 
generation, hit confirmation, and lead generation.112  Hit generation typically involves 
high-throughput screening of various chemical libraries for known targets of bioactivity 
against an identified target or biomarker.113  Following this, the hit confirmation phase is 
used to reevaluate the various leads and to perform additional research, such as dose 
response curves, functional assays, feasibility of synthesizing the compound, and binding 
assays, among others.  These tests are performed over several weeks and are followed by 
the lead generation phase, the goal of which is to synthesize the lead compounds and 
structural homologues that show promise as drug candidates.  The final price tag for this 
step in the drug development pipeline is estimated to be around $335 million in 
capitalized costs per marketed drug, with less than 5% of compounds screened making it 
through to the preclinical/animal model phase.114 
¶42 In contrast to early stage drug discovery, identification of disease-linked genes is 
remarkably cheaper.  High-density genotyping arrays used by GWAs are probably most 
analogous to the early stages of drug discovery, because they permit genome-wide 
genotyping of hundreds of thousands of SNPs.115  These typically consist of developing a 
research cohort of individuals sharing a common illness or disease and studying their 
genome for statistically common SNPs that exist in higher frequency when compared to 
the control group.  In the alternative, they involve monitoring a cohort whose genome 
profile is known for the development of a common disease.  These GWAs are 
particularly suited to discovering previously unsuspected genes or pathways involved in a 
specific disease.  The power of these hypothesis-free study designs in identifying the 
genetic factors of complex diseases is now well established.116 
¶43 While the cost of conducting GWAs can still be partially prohibitive for many 
academic research laboratories, the price is substantially less than that of drug discovery.  
 
108 See Robert G. Ridley, Plasmodium: Drug Discovery and Development—An Industrial Perspective, 
87 EXPERIMENTAL PARASITOLOGY 293, 293–302 (1997).  See also Simon A. Roberts, Drug Metabolism 
and Pharmacokinetics in Drug Discovery, 6 CURRENT OPINION IN DRUG DISCOVERY & DEV. 66, 66–68 
(2003); Simon Frantz, Screening the Right Candidate, 2 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 331, 331 (2003). 
109 See Srini Venkatesh & Robert A. Lipper, Role of the Development Scientist in Compound Lead 
Selection and Optimization, 89 J. PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. 145, 147 (2000). 
110 See Id. 
111 See generally Konrad H. Bleicher et al., Hit and Lead Generation: Beyond High-Throughput 
Screening, 2 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 369 (2003). 
112 Id. at 369–375. 
113 Id. at 372–377. 
114 DiMasi et al., supra note 12, at 161–166. 
115 See Pearson & Manolio, supra note 19, at 1335. 
116 Yohan Bossé et al., Identification of Susceptibility Genes for Complex Diseases Using Pooling-Based 
Genome-Wide Association Scans, 125 HUM. GENETICS 305, 305–306 (2009). 
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Technological developments, such as next-generation DNA sequencing and high-density 
genotyping arrays, have led to the discovery of genetic risk-factors for many significant 
human diseases.117  In 2000, a 2,000-person GWA covering ten million SNPs would 
carry a price tag of $20 billion, or $1.00 per SNP.118  Compare this to 2007 estimates, 
when the price was $0.001 per SNP.119  As technology and techniques continue to 
advance, the price of early stage discovery in genetic testing will continue to plummet.    
¶44 Further, genetic research studies very often result in information that can be used 
directly for diagnostic testing in patients and their family members.  Once a gene-trait 
association has been established, genetic tests are more “designed” than “discovered” and 
are developed through established scientific principles.120  A sequencing-based test costs 
roughly $1,000 per exon to develop.121  Given that the average gene has eight to ten 
exons (or coding regions),122 the cost of developing a laboratory-developed genetic test 
that utilizes even the more expensive full gene sequencing diagnostic approach (as 
opposed to the cheaper probe hybridization approach used to detect a single mutation)123 
is on average between $8,000 and $10,000.  
2. Costs Associated with Gaining Marketing Approval for Genetic Tests Are Lower 
than Drug Development Due to More Relaxed Government Regulation 
¶45 As discussed in the above section, the costs for gene-based molecular diagnostics 
are likely to be less than those of drug development.  However, proponents of DNA 
sequence patents might maintain that downstream costs for gaining FDA marketing 
approval for genetic tests could still pose significant barriers to test innovation and 
development.  Within the field of drug development, FDA regulation is a critical concern 
underscoring the need for patents.  The marketing of a new drug is prohibited unless that 
drug meets certain safety and efficacy standards.124  The process of demonstrating safety 
 
117 See, e.g., Alan Herbert et al., A Common Genetic Variant Is Associated with Adult and Childhood 
Obesity, 312 SCI. 279 (2006) (describing a screening method to detect obesity-related genetic variants); 
Robert J. Klein et al., Complement Factor H Polymorphism in Age-Related Macular Degeneration, 308 
SCI. 385 (2005) (describing a screening method to detect genetic variants associated with macular 
degeneration); John D. Rioux et al., Genome-Wide Association Study Identifies New Susceptibility Loci for 
Crohn Disease and Implicates Autophagy in Disease Pathogenesis, 39 NATURE GENETICS 596 (2007) 
(describing a screening method to detect genetic variants associated with Crohn’s disease); Robert Sladek 
et al., A Genome-Wide Association Study Identifies Novel Risk Loci for Type 2 Diabetes, 445 NATURE 881 
(2007) (describing a screening method to identify risk factors for Type 2 Diabetes); The Wellcome Trust 
Case Control Consortium, Genome-Wide Association Study of 14,000 Cases of Seven Common Diseases 
and 3,000 Shared Controls, 447 NATURE 661 (2007).  
118 Emma Hitt, Microarray Technologies: Bench to Bedside, 24 SCI. 1101, 1105 (2007); TERI A. 
MANOLIO, UPDATE ON GENOME-WIDE ASSOCIATION STUDIES: WE LIVE IN INTERESTING TIMES, NAT’L. 
HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (2007), available at  
http://www.genome.gov/Pages/About/OD/ReportsPublications/GWASUpdateSlides-9-19-07.pdf. 
119 Hitt, supra note 118, at 1105. 
120 Kathryn A. Phillips et al., Diagnostics and Biomarker Development: Priming the Pipeline, 5 NATURE 
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 463, 464 (2006).  See also NRC REPORT, supra note 3. 
121 Soma Das et al., Molecular Genetic Testing for Ultra Rare Diseases: Models for Translation from 
the Research Laboratory to the CLIA-Certified Diagnostic Laboratory, 10 GENETICS MED. 332, 336 
(2008). 
122 Meena Kishore Sakharkar et al., Distribution of Exons and Introns in the Human Genome, 4 IN 
SILICO BIOLOGY 387, 390 (2004). 
123 See generally NRC REPORT, supra note 3. 
124 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 201–704 (2006). 
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and efficacy ordinarily requires manufacturers to conduct clinical investigations of drugs 
that have not been previously tested, and it can carry significant costs and consume 
several years. 
¶46 The process of gaining marketing approval from the FDA is extensive and costly. 
Following lead development, the compound undergoes preclinical animal safety studies 
under good laboratory practice (GLP) conditions.125  At this stage, the pharmaceutical 
company would often file for an Investigational New Drug application, which is required 
to start clinical testing.  If approved, the compound can undergo its first entry into 
humans through Phase I clinical trials designed to identify any immediate safety 
problems and a safe clinical dosage range.126  Those compounds that survive the Phase I 
trials proceed to Phase II, which involves well-controlled clinical investigations designed 
to determine the therapeutic effectiveness of the drug, typically consisting of several 
hundred participants who have the pertinent condition or disease.127  If the drug is 
considered sufficiently safe and effective following Phase II trials, it enters the pivotal 
Phase III trial.  Phase III studies confirm the therapeutic effectiveness of the drug, 
provide more information on the drug’s side effects, reveal whether it interacts with foods 
or other medications, and determine whether certain patient populations should avoid its 
use altogether.128  
¶47 The journey from initial concept to a marketed drug is long and statistically more 
likely to end in failure than success.129  The average time for a drug to reach the market is 
around twelve to fifteen years,130 and only one in 5,000 compounds screened in early-
stage discovery successfully makes it through to market, although both figures vary 
dramatically with disease area.  Most failures occur at the early or preclinical stage, and 
only 20% of compounds that enter human trials are ever successfully approved.  The 
estimated costs of clinical trials average $467 million, bringing the total cost of drug 
development (R&D plus clinical approval) to approximately $802 million (in 2000 
dollars).131 
¶48 In contrast, governmental regulation of genetic tests is much less defined than 
governmental regulation of drug approval.132  At present, genetic tests are used in one of 
two separate forms: in vitro diagnostic devices (IVDs) or laboratory developed tests 
(LDTs).133  FDA regulation of genetic tests varies significantly depending on the manner 
in which these tests are produced and sold.      
 
125 See Kendy L. Keatley, A Comparison of the U.S. EPA FIFRA GLP Standards with the U.S. FDA 
GLP Standards for Nonclinical Laboratory Studies, 7 QUALITY ASSURANCE 147, 147 (1999). 
126 Richard J. Findlay, Originator Drug Development, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 227, 227–228 (1999).   
127 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)–(b) (2010). 
128 John Patrick Dillman, Note, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases: Desperate Times 
Require Desperate Measures, 44 VAND. L. REV. 925, 929 (1991).   
129 See generally DiMasi, supra note 12. 
130 Id. at 167. 
131 Id. at 151. 
132 Andrew S. Robertson, Taking Responsibility: Regulations and Protections in Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Testing, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 221–225 (2009). 
133 Id. at 223; GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CTR., FDA REGULATION OF GENETIC TESTS 1 (2006) (discussing 
how IVDs are defined as “reagents, instruments, and systems intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or 
other conditions, including a determination of the state of health, in order to cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent 
disease or its sequelae.”).   
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¶49 The FDA is responsible for regulating tests sold as IVDs, defined as “reagents, 
instruments, and systems intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions . 
. . .”134  This definition includes tests manufactured by one company and then sold as a 
single-unit kit to a laboratory for genetic testing.  Such kits must undergo successful pre-
market review before they may be commercially distributed.  In order to receive FDA 
authorization to sell the kits, companies must submit information to the FDA 
demonstrating that the test is safe and effective.135  
¶50 The FDA’s review of IVD test kits, like other products the agency regulates, is 
limited to the manufacturer’s “intended use,” as evidenced by the claims that the 
manufacturer makes about the product in labeling.136  A manufacturer may not promote a 
test kit for an “off-label” use, such as one not approved by the FDA.  However, it is 
important that the FDA does not regulate claims made by laboratories using FDA-
regulated test kits that go beyond the approved labeling.  The FDA has, to date, reviewed 
fewer than twenty genetic test kits.137  These include tests for mutations causing the blood 
clotting disorders Factor II and Factor V, some of the mutations that cause cystic fibrosis, 
two genes within the cytochrome P450 family of enzymes, which are involved in drug 
metabolism, and variants in the UGT1A1 gene, which are also involved in metabolism of 
certain drugs.   
¶51 Most genetic tests available today are not marketed as complete FDA-approved 
IVD test kits, but they are instead derived or assembled within the clinical laboratories 
themselves.138  These LDTs, or home brews, fall outside of FDA regulatory authority.139  
Clinical and research laboratories often develop and prepare their own tests that are 
intended to diagnose various medical conditions, using ingredients that they frequently 
purchase from biological or chemical suppliers.  The “active ingredients” of a test refer to 
the marketed ingredients and materials composed of chemicals or antibodies, which are 
useful only in testing for one specific disease or condition.  In laboratory terms, the 
chemical for which one conducts an analysis is called the analyte.  Therefore, these active 
ingredients are referred to as analyte specific reagents (ASRs).  Marketing of ASRs is 
permitted, however, and is outside the regulatory purview of the FDA.  
¶52 Myriad’s BRCA genetic tests are considered LDTs, along with a wide variety of 
tests used in the diagnosis of infectious diseases, cancer, genetic conditions, and various 
other conditions.  These tests are developed in-house and are not actively regulated by the 
FDA.  Thus, the ingredients used in the tests are generally not produced under FDA-
assured manufacturing quality control.  Because of this regulatory exception, genetic 
testing services using home brewed tests can be marketed directly to both the medical 
 
134 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (1980).   
135 How Drugs are Developed and Approved, U.S. FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/default.htm 
(last updated Apr. 23, 2010). 
136 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2006). 
137 For a current list of clinically used genetic tests, see GENETESTS, NAT’L. CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INFO., http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/GeneTests (last visited Mar. 16, 2011).     
138 See Diagnostics Kits/USA Regulations Review, COMMONS BASED RESEARCH, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/commonsbasedresearch/Diagnostic_Kits/USA_Regualtion_Review (last 
visited April 12, 2011). 
139 Robertson, supra note 132, at 221–22. 
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community and the public without FDA regulation or oversight.140  As a result, costs of 
market entry for genetic tests are significantly lower than those associated with drug 
development. 
B. Rewards for Genetic Test Development Are Partially Secured by  
Government Sponsorship 
¶53 In addition to the significantly lower cost of genetic test development relative to 
drug development, it is important to recognize two additional incentives that contribute to 
innovation: governmental contribution to initial R&D and governmental interest in 
promoting personalized medicine in clinical healthcare.  
¶54 Regarding basic research, a large portion of the information required for early 
discovery in gene-based molecular diagnostics is heavily sponsored by government and 
philanthropic funding.  The publicly funded International HapMap Project, for example, 
produced a resource with 3.9 million SNPs entered for each of the samples, and the 
results are publicly available.141  The information from the HapMap has already led to 
multiple genetic tests, including the identification of genes for age-related macular 
degeneration and autism.142  Likewise, large GWAs conducted by organizations, such as 
the Coriell Institute and Kaiser Permanente, have received near-full funding from public 
sources, and they should produce a significant foundation of information regarding 
genotype/phenotype associations.143  These studies will provide countless hits that will, in 
turn, be developed into gene-based molecular diagnostics.  
¶55 Market entry into clinical healthcare, likewise, is starting to gather significant 
government support without the aid of patents.  As discussed in Part III(B)(2), patient use 
of genetic testing is heavily reliant on adoption by third-party payers, as only one-fifth of 
out-of-pocket payers who would benefit from genetic testing are likely to pursue testing.  
The decision to reimburse for genetic testing rests heavily on the predicted utility in a 
clinical setting, including its ability to affect clinical outcomes and promote informed 
decision-making.  However, clinical utility in itself is difficult to measure.  
¶56 Here, again, the U.S. government is showing signs of significant support.  The 
potential savings to healthcare following the widespread adoption of genetic testing has 
prompted U.S. policies that not only provide Medicare coverage of genetic tests where 
utility is already demonstrated, but also cover the costs of genetic tests where clinical 
utility is only suspected.  For this, we turn to the example of genetic tests used to 
determine the dosage level of warfarin.  
¶57 The anticoagulant medication warfarin is used to prevent and treat blood clots.144  
Approximately two million people start taking warfarin each year; physicians commonly 
 
140 Id. 
141 Id.  See also Int’l HapMap Consortium, A Haplotype Map, supra note 18; Int’l HapMap Consortium, 
A Second Generation Human Haplotype Map of Over 3.1 Million SNPs, 449 NATURE 851, 851 (2007). 
142 Coriell Awarded $3.1 Million for Next Phase of the HapMap Project, GENETIC ENGINEERING & 
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.genengnews.com/gen-news-highlights/coriell-
awarded-3-1m-for-next-phase-of-the-hapmap-project/10146726. 
143 See Int’l HapMap Consortium, A Haplotype Map, supra note 18; Int’l HapMap Consortium, A 
Second Generation Human Haplotype Map, supra note 141. 
144 See generally Daniel S. Budnitz et al., National Surveillance of Emergency Department Visits for 
Outpatient Adverse Drug Events, 296 JAMA 1858 (2006).  The cases that are seen in emergency 
departments represent a subset of total adverse drug events, but the precise fraction they represent is 
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prescribe it for patients with a history of atrial fibrillation, recurrent stroke, deep vein 
thrombosis, or pulmonary embolism, as well as for patients who have had heart valve 
replacements.145  A major challenge in treating patients with warfarin is that the optimal 
dose varies greatly from person to person.  If the dose taken is too high, users are subject 
to an increased risk of serious bleeding.  On the other hand, if the dose is too low, users 
are subject to an increased risk of stroke.  Indeed, warfarin is the second most common 
drug—after insulin—among those implicated in emergency room visits for adverse drug 
events, causing an average of more than 43,000 cases per year in 2004 and 2005.146   
¶58 In 2008, the FDA approved a genetic test that can help physicians prevent adverse 
responses to warfarin.147  The test, which costs up to $500, could potentially lead to other 
healthcare savings by leveraging personalized medicine to reduce the number of 
problems that result from improper dosing.  A report published by the American 
Enterprise Institute–Brookings Joint Center (AEI-Brookings) (with input from the FDA) 
reached some very impressive conclusions.  Specifically, the report concluded:  
We estimate that formally integrating genetic testing into routine warfarin 
therapy could allow American warfarin users to avoid 85,000 serious bleeding 
events and 17,000 strokes annually.  We estimate the reduced health care 
spending from integrating genetic testing into warfarin therapy to be $1.1 billion 
annually, with a range of about $100 million to $2 billion.148 
Interestingly, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) disagreed with the 
AEI–Brookings report, stating, “[A]vailable evidence does not demonstrate that 
pharmacogenomic testing to predict warfarin responsiveness improves health outcomes 
in Medicare beneficiaries.”149  Regardless, the significant potential healthcare savings 
associated with genetic tests for warfarin dosing prompted CMS to take an unprecedented 
track.  While CMS would not directly reimburse for warfarin genetic tests, they did 
decide to pursue a strategy known as “coverage with evidence development,” authorized 
 
uncertain.  An estimate of total adverse drug events would include those occurring among hospital and 
nursing home inpatients, those treated in clinics, offices, and homes, and those not treated—in addition to 
those treated in emergency departments.   
145 Andrew McWilliam et al., Health Care Savings from Personalizing Medicine Using Genetic Testing: 
The Case of Warfarin 1, 2 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 06-23, 
2006). 
146 Id. 
147 Genetic tests for warfarin sensitivity are comprised of two separate genetic analyses coupled with a 
linkage algorithm.  The test that can estimate a patient's sensitivity to warfarin is referred to as the VKORC1 
(vitamin K epoxide reductase) test.  VKORC1 is the gene that codes for the enzyme that is the site of action 
where warfarin exerts its effect.  Genetic testing can indicate whether the patient may be more sensitive or 
less sensitive to warfarin than “average.”  The test that can estimate a patient's rate of warfarin metabolism 
is referred to as the 2C9 or CYP2C9 test.  CYP2C9 refers to the particular liver enzyme that is primarily 
responsible for metabolizing (breaking down) the most active component of warfarin.  See Henry I. Bussey 
et. al, Genetic Testing for Warfarin (Coumadin) Dosing? – Not Yet Ready for Prime Time, CLOTCARE 
ONLINE RESOURCE (July 2007), http://www.clotcare.com/clotcare/wararingenetictesting.aspx. 
148 McWilliam, supra note 145, at Executive Summary. 
149 Proposed Decision Memo for Pharmacogenomic Testing for Warfarin Response (CAG-00400N), 
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under the Social Security Act.150  This strategy allows CMS to cover the cost of genetic 
tests for warfarin responsiveness if they are a part of a “prospective, randomized, 
controlled clinical study.”151  In short, instead of requiring that clinical utility of genetic 
tests be provided prior to coverage, CMS will cover the costs of clinical genetic testing as 
a means to demonstrate its clinical utility. 
¶59 While this situation is the first of its kind in genetic testing, it illustrates two 
important points.  First, the potential value that personalized medicine holds in improving 
cost-effectiveness of medical care is significant.  In the case of warfarin dosing, genetic 
tests can reduce the number of adverse events that lead to serious bleeding incidents, 
heart stroke, and increased hospital visits.   
¶60 Second, relevant to reward incentives in genetic test innovation, this example 
demonstrates that the government recognizes the potential clinical utility of genetic 
testing and is willing to sponsor clinical studies to that effect.  Applying the coverage 
with evidence development strategy to FDA-approved and home-brewed genetic testing 
represents a significant investment by the U.S. government to fully explore the cost-
saving potential of genetic testing.  Similar provisions are present in subsequent 
legislation, including the Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act of 2007,152 
introduced by then-Senator Barack Obama, and the recent healthcare legislation.153 
¶61 Government confidence in personalized medicine represents—at least for the short-
term—a decreased market risk for genetic testing.  Potential market size and security 
represent a key reward incentive in commercial innovation.  Patents serve as a 
mechanism to artificially decrease market risk by reducing competition.  However, 
government sponsorship of the genetic testing market can also serve to reduce this risk 
and can help investors better predict market size, reliability, and duration with greater 
accuracy.  As such, in terms of incentive mechanisms, government investment in genetic 
tests can function analogous to patents.  
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
¶62 The debate over DNA patents has intensified following the federal court ruling in 
AMP v. USPTO.154  DNA patents have the potential to pose significant barriers to gene 
test innovation as well as access to gene tests in the clinical setting.155  In terms of R&D, 
DNA patents force researchers to choose amongst ceasing research activities on a 
patented DNA sequence, licensing the rights to research the gene from the patent holder, 
or ignoring the gene’s patent status and risk legal liability.  While the predominant choice 
among academic researchers is unclear, each of these choices would only hamper their 
research efforts.  
¶63 In terms of clinical access to genetic tests, patents have the potential to create 
barriers due to limited availability of genetic tests and price distortions caused by market 
 
150 Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b-12, 1862 (2006). 
151 Proposed Decision Memo, supra note 149. 
152 S. 976, 110th Cong. (2007). 
153 See Ewen Callaway, US Healthcare Bill Gets Personal, NEW SCIENTIST (Mar. 24, 2010 at 12:45 
PM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18698-us-healthcare-bill-gets-personal.html.  See also Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
154 See supra Part II(C). 
155 See supra Part III(A), III(B). 
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exclusivity.156  Case studies demonstrate that the limited availability of genetic tests, 
caused primarily by exclusive licensing practices, can prevent patients and healthcare 
providers from obtaining top quality genetic tests and second-opinion testing.  Price 
barriers due to patents, however, are not as evident in genetic tests; indeed, tests in both 
competitive and non-competitive markets are priced similarly.157  Nonetheless, it is clear 
that patients have greater access to genetic tests within competitive markets.   
¶64 With respect to the requirement of patents for innovation, many proponents of 
DNA patenting cite drug development as a proper analogy.158  Patenting of drugs is 
arguably justified because of the heavy investment needed to shepherd a drug candidate 
through development to market.  For drug development, early capital is required to 
finance animal research and human clinical trials and also to obtain FDA approval.  
Likewise, the failure rate of drug candidates in the development pipeline is high, and 
carries with it a significant capital cost.  Recouping these costs requires stronger 
guarantees for market exclusivity.  Patents, in turn, offer a tangible way of protecting the 
consumer market for their respective drugs, while helping recoup the costs and risks 
undertaken by the drug developers.   
¶65 But research and marketing efforts for gene-based diagnostic tests do not require 
the same investment or carry the same risks as drug development.159  First, in terms of 
costs, R&D is heavily funded by government and public sponsorship, including 
international collaborations like the Human Genome Project and the HapMap Project.  
Simultaneously, the costs of research in genetic testing are decreasing rapidly as 
technology advances.  In addition, approval to market genetic tests can be obtained 
without the expensive clinical trials associated with drug approval.  Safety and efficacy 
can be demonstrated through much smaller trials, and the scientific standard for 
statistically significant gene-disease correlations has yet to be established.  These more 
relaxed approval standards should significantly decrease the price of clinical trials for 
genetic testing, estimated to constitute approximately half of the $802 million price tag, 
or $454 million in the drug development context.   
¶66 Further, the costs of clinical testing can be avoided altogether as genetic tests can 
still be used in a clinical setting without FDA approval.160  As discussed, there are 
multiple market points-of-entry for genetic tests, either through FDA-approved “test kits” 
or through the selling of ASR reagents to be used in home-brewed genetic tests.  Unlike 
drug development, the fundamental technologies required for genetic testing are typically 
designed rather than discovered, and can undergo continuous modifications throughout 
the product life cycle, even after market entry.  In some cases, such as the discovery of 
the hemochromatosis gene, discovery of a genetic marker for a particular disease has 
been applied to the clinical setting almost immediately following publication.161  As such, 
the risk that a disease-linked gene will not make it to market is much lower than that of a 
drug candidate.   
 
156 See supra Part III(A). 
157 See supra Part III(B). 
158 See supra Part IV. 
159 See supra Part IV(A)(1)–(2). 
160 See supra Part IV(A). 
161 See Andrews, supra note 6, at 77.  See also Merz, supra note 56, at 577–79. 
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¶67 Finally, the U.S. government has shown significant interest in developing the 
personalized medicine market, thereby decreasing the risks associated with market 
rewards for genetic test development.162  The use of coverage with evidence development 
in warfarin gene testing demonstrates how CMS is willing to pay for genetic tests even 
before clinical utility has been proven.  While these actions may not become 
commonplace, they do underscore the U.S. government’s commitment to fostering the 
growth of the genetic testing market.  
¶68 In summary, the costs involved in the development of genetic testing, in terms of 
both R&D and obtaining marketing approval, are much lower than that of drug 
development.  Likewise, the market for genetic tests is growing rapidly, with significant 
support from the federal government.  While downstream patents may help competition 
in the genetic testing market, upstream patents on DNA sequences can actually hinder 
innovation and can limit patient access to quality testing due to exclusive licensing 
practices.  These considerations suggest that not only are DNA sequence patents not 
required for innovation in the development of gene-based molecular diagnostics, but also 
they actually hinder the advancement and clinical adoption of personalized medicine. 
162 See supra Part IV(B). 
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